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with only 68% of those assigned to the program group immediately enrolling (within the first semester after assignment) and participating in the program for at least 1 week. Second, wages are not well defined for those who are not employed. Third, outcome variables are missing for some participants in the study at the various weeks. Most previous analyses of these data ignored noncompliance by focusing on intention-to-treat effects of being offered participation in Job Corps In our analysis, we include all randomized units and explicitly address all three complications.
The framework we adopt uses potential outcomes to define causal effects regardless of the mode of inference, often referred to as the Rubin Causal Model (RCM; Holland, 1986); causal effects are defined by comparisons of potential outcomes on a common set of units (Rubin, 1974 (Rubin, , 1978 (Rubin, , 2005 . We apply Principal Stratification (PS; Frangakis and Rubin, 2002) , which was originally introduced to address post-treatment complications within the RCM. PS has often been used to represent and solve single complications, but few papers have dealt with more than one complication simultaneously. In general, the analysis is more complicated than that in the presence of each of the complications separately, and complexity tends to grow exponentially with the number of distinct complications.
The three complications have different implications for causal analysis. Specifically, noncompliance and partially defined outcomes limit meaningful estimands to particular principal strata, and so require new definitions of causal estimands. Missing outcomes are tackled within the same general framework, but, in contrast, the parameters governing the missingness are considered to be nuisance parameters. Because access to Job Corps was essentially denied to those assigned to the control group, we define compliers to be those individuals who would have immediately enrolled if offered the program and all others noncompliers. We further classify the individuals into principal strata according to the joint values, when assigned to be trained and when assigned not to be trained, of their (1) potential compliances, (2) potential employment statuses, and (3) potential missingness behaviors.
Our primary causal estimands are: the average causal effect on employment for compliers and the average causal effect on wages for the always-employed compliers (i.e., those compliers who would be employed irrespective of treatment assignment), and those estimands within subgroups defined by observed characteristics. Other policy-relevant estimands are the relative sizes of the various principal strata and, when employed, the within-principal-stratum distributions of wages, under treatment or under control, as well as the distribution of covariates within principal strata.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents some descriptive statistics, showing how some naive conclusions regarding the effects of the program can be misleading. Section 3 discusses the framework needed to address the three complications simultaneously. Section 4 outlines the likelihood approach used to characterize the effects of Job Corps. Section 5 presents the results of the empirical analysis and provides some concluding remarks.
General considerations and descriptive univariate summaries
For all units in the National Job Corps Study, covariates, variables unaffected by treatment assignment, were collected (X). Some subpopulations defined by X were randomized into the program versus control group with varying, but known, probabilities. We use all units from the original research sample: we eliminated only the few units who did not complete the baseline interview, the units who died during the follow-up, and the units who, although assigned to the control group, were admitted to the program and excluded from the Job Corps study.
Summary statistics for many of the covariates used in our analysis are displayed in Table 1 (N = 13, 987), and reveal some missing values. We addressed this missing data problem using the MICE (van Buuren and Oudshoorn, 1999) procedure in R to multiply impute the incomplete multivariate data. We used only the baseline covariates as predictors in the chained equations, and included as fully observed covariates indicators of missingness for each of the covariates with a percentage of missing values above 20%. Linear regressions were used for numerical covariates; binary/multinomial logistic models for dichotomous/polytomous variables. Ten different imputations were generated; given the very small variability of results across multiple imputations, as found also in Zhang et al. (2009) , we only present the results from one singly imputed data set (Rubin, 1987) . Table 2 presents summary statistics for compliance and outcome variables: employment, total earnings, weekly hours, and hourly wages at the three follow-up interviews. We use a single missing data indicator at each time point because hours worked (employment status) and wages are nearly always either both observed or both missing. There is actually a small number of units (38, 34, 60 at the three weeks, respectively) for whom the employment status is observed but information on wages is partially missing (e.g., wages are known only for some jobs but not for others). For these situations, wages were constructed using the same imputation strategy used by Schochet (2001) in the publicly released data for the subsample of respondents to the 208-week interview.
Some naive conclusions about the effects of the training program can be drawn from Table   2 . For example, by comparing the employment rate of respondent treated units with that of respondent control units, we observe a negative effect at week 52 (−6%), and a small but positive effect at weeks 130 and 208 (2% and 4%, respectively). These contrasts can be formally interpreted, however, neither as estimates of the effect of participation in the program, because they neglect noncompliance, nor as estimates of ITT effects, because they also neglect nonresponse, unless under the implausible MCAR assumption. Similarly, we can naively compare the average hourly wage of respondent employed treated units with that of respondent employed control units, showing positive effects on wages ranging from 0.24 $/hour to 0.34 $/hour. Again, these estimates neglect missing data, noncompliance, and partially defined wages due to nonemployment, thus contrasting averages in groups that are not comparable. Some additional informal comparisons can be computed in the form of moment-based IV estimates of local average treatment effects (LATEs, Imbens and Angrist, 1994) , as the ratio of ITT effects for outcomes (i.e., comparisons by treatment assignment) to the proportion of compliers, still neglecting missing data. For employment, these estimated LATEs are equal to −0.10, 0.03, and 0.06 at week 52, 130 and 208, respectively. In the case of wages, estimated LATEs were computed using only the employed units, thus neglecting missing outcomes and partially defined wages; they are 0.43, 0.48, and 0.34 $/hour at the three weeks respectively.
3 Technical framework
General setup
Consider a large hypothetical super-population of individuals, each of whom can potentially participate in Job Corps and be assigned treatment z, with z = 1 for active treatment (i.e., offered enrollment in Job Corps), z = 0 for control. A probability sample of N individuals from this super-population comprises the participants in the study.
We adopt the Rubin Causal Model as a framework to define causal effects. Assuming SUTVA (Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption; Rubin, 1978 Rubin, , 1980 Rubin, , 1990 , we define, for each unit i and each post-treatment variable, two potential outcomes, each associated with one of the two treatment levels that unit i can potentially receive. SUTVA states that potential outcomes for individual i are unaffected by the treatment assignments of other individuals (no interference), and, for each unit, that there are no hidden versions of treatment or control being considered.
It is, in principle, feasible to use the PS framework to analyze the three weeks jointly; this, however, would imply a far larger number of possible principal strata and a consequent growing complexity of model specification and inference (as in Jin and Rubin, 2009 ). Although we consider each of the three weeks independently, our model is still quite complicated. Compared to analyses conducted by others, however, ours allows one to compare results over the three weeks under study, because all three are derived using all randomized units, without restriction to those with complete outcome data at the different weeks (available-case analysis). For unit i, we let D i (1) denote the binary compliance indicator when assigned treatment; i.e., D i (1) = 1 implies unit i would immediately enroll in Job Corps if offered it, and D i (1) = 0 otherwise; D i (0) = 0 ∀i by definition, and so is suppressed notationally; D i (1) = 1, 0 implies that the ith unit "does" or "does not" do as assigned. Compliance status does not change over time by definition and can be considered a covariate, which is not observed for units assigned to the control group. As for the other post-assignment variables, we suppress notation for the three outcome periods. Respectively, let S i (z), W i (z), and M i (z) represent the potential employment status indicators (1 = employed, 0 = nonemployed; "S " for "salaried"), the potential wages, and the potential missingness indicators, if individual i is assigned to treatment z, z = 0, 1. Following Zhang et al. (2008) , because wages are well-defined only if S i (z) = 1, we define the wages to be W i (z) = * when S i (z) = 0. In our study, wages and employment status are either both observed or both missing, so that M i (z) = 0 when S i (z) and W i (z) are both observed, and M i (z) = 1 when S i (z) and W i (z) are both missing and are coded as "?". Individual causal effects are defined as comparisons of potential outcomes, e.g.,
, where this last quantity is defined to be * if either
At most three of the six potential outcomes are observed, those corresponding to the treatment level to which unit i is assigned.
The distribution of Z conditional on the observable potential outcomes and observed covariates defines the assignment mechanism, which allows us to draw inferences about causal estimands from the observed data. The random assignment of Z in our study within subpopulations defined by X means that:
where the bold indicates column vectors of the corresponding unit indicators (e.g.,
The observable potential outcomes for a sampled unit are a joint draw from the super-population distribution. Their distribution is, by definition, unit exchangeable, that is, invariant under a permutation of the unit indices. Therefore, appealing to deFinetti's theorem, with essentially no loss of generality, their joint distribution can be written as (Rubin, 1978) :
where the global parameter θ has prior distribution p(θ), and the parameter ϕ governing the distribution of X, is a priori independent of θ. In what follows we will conduct a likelihood analysis for θ, assuming the value of θ that governed the distribution of observable data has been drawn from a prior distribution with compact support.
In this framework, D, S, and M play the role of intermediate variables, which allow us to classify units into some principal strata, which are generally latent. Ignoring, for now, the missingness mechanism, units can be cross-classified by compliance status and employment status: [{c, n}×
{EE, EN, NE, NN}]
, into eight groups, where we define:
• c = {i : D i (1) = 1}, the subpopulation of compliers;
• n = {i : D i (1) = 0}, the subpopulation of noncompliers; • NN = {i : S i (1) = S i (0) = 0}, those who would be nonemployed regardless of their treatment assignment; for this stratum,
Without additional assumptions, group membership for unit i,
takes on values in {c&EE, c&EN, c&NE, c&NN, n&EE, n&EN, n&NE, n&NN}, is unobserved for all units; by the randomization, however, the eight types have, in expectation, the same distribution in both treatment groups. The strata can be considered covariates unaffected by treatment assignment, so that, in the same way randomization allows us to compare treated and control units with the same values of any X variable (e.g., females), we can compare treated and control units belonging to the same principal stratum. The only complication is that principal strata can, in general, be only partially observed, so that conditioning on principal strata is not as simple as conditioning on fully observed covariates. Consequently, assumptions can play far more important roles with principal strata than with fully observed covariates. Some of these assumptions reduce the number of principal strata; others impose certain restrictions on the distribution of outcomes within or among strata: these include various forms of exclusion restrictions.
Without any assumptions on the missingness mechanism, each of the above eight principal Among the assumptions about the missing data process proposed in the literature, one that appears to be plausible in our context is Missing at Random (MAR; Rubin, 1976 ). MAR cannot be tested without auxiliary information, and its plausibility depends on the information available in a specific study. In general, MAR is more reasonable when the set of covariates contains rich information on units. MAR allows the missingness probabilities to depend on observed values but, given those, not on any missing values. If MAR holds and the parameters of the missing data mechanism are distinct from those of the outcome distribution, then the missing data process is said to be ignorable (Rubin, 1976) , meaning that valid likelihood inference ignores the missing data model.
The compliance indicator D i (1) is missing for 1% of units in the treatment group, presumably due to data coding errors. Throughout, we assume those indicators to be MAR, thus avoiding an explicit missingness indicator for them.
Assumptions and estimands
We assume exclusion restrictions for noncompliers for both W and S ; that is, for noncompliers, potential outcomes do not depend on treatment assignment:
Exclusion restriction for S for noncompliers
If D i (z) = 0 (z = 0, 1), then S i (0) = S i (1).
Exclusion restriction for W for noncompliers
These assumptions are substantive ones that may be violated depending on the empirical setting:
Here, they appear rather plausible. The offer to be trained should not alter the activities or the labour market behavior of those units who are not willing to accept the offer within a reasonable length of time; in addition, potential employers are plausibly unaware of the assignment status of noncompliers, so that future job and wage offers cannot be affected by the assignment (see Angrist, 1990 Causal estimands of interest are usually, but not always, summaries of individual causal effects on a common set of units. Here we focus on the following average treatment effects in the superpopulation, because participants are randomly drawn from the population of eligible applicants, and the study has been conducted in order to inform policy makers on the effects of the program on such target super-populations. Specifically our estimands are:
• the average treatment effect of Z on program participation, D:
which equals the proportion of compliers in the super-population;
• the average treatment effect of Z on employment, S :
which, by the exclusion restrictions, equals the difference of the proportions of EN and NE compliers in the super-population
• the average treatment effect of Z on employment, S , for compliers, which is usually interpreted as the effect of participation, D, on S :
In our analysis of JC, the effect of assignment for compliers is interpreted as the effect of immediate participation in JC relative to non-immediate participation, which may include no participation in any training program, participation in other training programs available on the market, or later participation in JC.
• the average treatment effect of Z on wages, W, for the always employed compliers, which is interpreted as the effect of participation on wages for the always-employed:
In the last two formulas, the expectations are taken over a subset of the entire super-population, the compliers for ∆ (DS ) and the always-employed compliers for ∆
.
The relative sizes in the population of the six principal strata are themselves relevant descriptive estimands:
All previous estimands can be defined also conditional on specific values of some of the covariates.
Policy-relevant information can also be obtained from our likelihood analysis about the distribution of baseline characteristics within each principal stratum, for example, the means of the covariates within strata:
The ability to characterize the latent subgroups of units in terms of their initial conditions is an advantage of the approach we adopt, and may be particularly useful for targeting future interventions.
Mode of inference 4.1 Observed groups of units
Inference can be viewed as a missing data problem, because we cannot observe which stratum each unit belongs to. For each unit i, the treatment assignment indicator Z i and the covariates X i are always observed. Further, for unit i the other observed values are 
Among units with observed outcomes, we can observe the following groups, defined according to different combinations of observed Z, D and S :
, those who are assigned to the treatment group, take the treatment, and are employed; they are a mixture of the two principal strata c&EE and c&EN;
and S i,obs = 0}, those who are assigned to the treatment group, take the treatment, and are nonemployed; they are a mixture of the two principal strata c&NE and c&NN;
(1) = 0 and S i,obs = 1}, those who are assigned to the treatment group, do not comply with assignment, and are employed; they belong to the principal stratum n&EE;
, those who are assigned to the treatment group, do not comply with assignment, and are not employed; they belong to the principal stratum n&NN;
and S i,obs = 1}, those who are assigned to the treatment group, with missing compliance status, and are employed; they are a mixture of the three principal strata c&EE, c&EN, n&EE;
and S i,obs = 0}, those who are assigned to the treatment group, with missing compliance status, and are not employed; they belong to the three principal strata c&NE, c&NN, n&NN;
and S i,obs = 1}, those who are assigned to the control group and are employed; they are a mixture of the three principal strata c&EE, c&NE, n&EE;
and S i,obs = 0}, those who are assigned to the control group and are not employed; they are a mixture of the three principal strata c&EN, c&NN, n&NN.
For units with missing outcomes, the values of S and W are not observed; the observed groups are:
and S i,obs =?}, those who are assigned to the treatment group and take the treatment; they are a mixture of the four principal strata c&EE, c&EN, c&NE, c&NN;
and S i,obs =?}, those who are assigned to the treatment group and do not comply with assignment; they are a mixture of the two principal strata n&EE, n&NN;
and S i,obs =?}, those who are assigned to the control group and therefore have unknown compliance status; they are a mixture of all the principal strata in G.
In Table 3 , the correspondence between observed and latent groups is summarized.
Distributions for groups and potential outcomes given covariates
In order to form the likelihood function, we need to specify, first, a model for the principal stratum membership, G, given X and, second, the distribution of the potential wages conditional on G and X. Note that X includes all the covariates, as defined in Table 1 To simplify the notation, we assume that X includes the constant term -that is, a column containing the unit vector. We specify a multinomial logistic model for the k-dimensional vector of principal strata memberships:
where g ∈ G, and the k th principal stratum (n&NN) is taken as the baseline (that is, α k = 0), and let π i:g be the probability of belonging to stratum g for unit i, given the vector of pre-treatment covariates X i . Alternative specifications, such as sequential logistic models, multinomial probit models, or their t-based extensions (Liu, 2004) , could also be used.
We specify a Normal distribution for log-wages conditional on covariates X:
Notationally, we let N i (µ, σ) be the probability density function of a Normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ evaluated at log(W i ). Zhang et al. (2009) already showed, for the same study, that alternative Box-Cox transformations (other than the logarithmic one and corresponding to different parametric families of distributions for wages) do not alter results significantly; so we maintained the assumptions of log-normality of wages conditional on principal strata, treatment assignment and a large set of covariates.
For the c&EE group, the parameters of the wage distribution vary between the treatment groups; for the c&EN group, wages are only defined on We denote by θ sci = {α, β, σ} the vector parameter of scientific interest, a function of θ assumed to be distinct from the function of θ, θ mis , governing the missingness mechanism, where
Assuming MAR, the observed data likelihood function is proportional to the joint distribution of As a robustness check, alternative nonignorable missingness assumptions are considered in the empirical analysis, based on different behavioral hypotheses on the missingness mechanism.
Details on these assumptions and the ML analysis under them are presented in the Appendix.
Estimation of causal estimands
Causal effects are estimated in each principal stratum as functions of the observed data and the ML estimates of parameters, averaging over the estimated population distribution of covariates in that principal stratum using the design weights to weight the N units in the sample to represent the superpopulation. More explicitly, lettingπ i:g = Pr(G i = g|X i ,α), we estimate the proportion in each stratum asπ
where ω i are design weights in the original survey. Then, the causal effect of Z on D is estimated as the proportion of compliers:∆ (ZD) =π c&EE +π c&EN +π c&NE +π c&NN =π c , and the causal effect of Z on S is estimated as the difference of the estimated proportions of EN and NE compliers:
=π c&EN −π c&NE . Similarly, estimates of the average treatment effects on employment for compliers, and on wages for always-employed compliers are obtained as:
In order to characterize the latent subgroups, the means of the covariates within each principal stratum are estimated as follows:μ
By using the estimated principal strata membership proportionπ i:g , we are implicitly imputing the potential outcome for given ω i and X i an infinite number of times, thus estimating superpopulation parameters. If the asymptotic covariance matrix of the estimates were obtained, the asymptotic standard errors of the above quantities could be computed using the Delta method or methods such as the SEM algorithm (Meng and Rubin, 1991) . However, even in relatively large samples, the sampling distribution of ML estimators is usually not well approximated by the standard asymp- 5 Likelihood-based estimation: results
Likelihood estimation of causal estimands under MAR
We discuss results obtained by maximizing the likelihood function and provide ML estimates of the average treatment effects on employment (∆ (DS ) ) and wages (∆ (DW) ) for each week separately, together with the estimated proportions of the principal strata, as described in Section 4.3. We do not report maximum likelihood estimates of the model parameters, which are however available upon request from the authors. Most of the covariates' coefficients have the expected sign; for example, higher educated people tend to have higher wages irrespective of their principal stratum.
We also compare the maximized likelihood under the general model with the maximized likelihoods under three meaningful restrictions: (a) monotonicity of employment: π c&NE = 0; (b) no effect of assignment on employment for compliers: ∆ Table 4 ), suggesting that all assumed six latent strata exist, and that there is a positive proportion of compliers, π c&NE , for whom training appears detrimental in terms of employment. A possible conjecture is that these people might have raised their reservation wages as a consequence of training, and refuse job offers that would be accepted with no training. As expected, the proportions of c&NE decreases over time, and the non-negligible percentage of them four years after assignment may be simply due to the structural mobility in and out of employment of American youths.
Second, the proportions of π c&NE and π c&EN appear to be roughly equal to each other at all three time points, thus suggesting that the average effect of assignment on employment for compliers is absent. In fact, the restriction of no average effect of assignment on employment appears to be plausible at all three weeks (see the values of λ 0W in Table 4 by looking at the sizes of the two groups of c&NE and c&EN, instead of at the overall effect on employment for compliers, our analysis offers a more refined understanding of how such a small estimated effect on employment was produced.
Third, no effect of assignment on wages for the always-employed compliers is rejected by the data at all weeks (see values of λ S 0 in Table 4) : From Table 5 , we see that the average effect of assignment on wages is found to be small but positive (about 0.28, 0.25 and 0.29 $/hour at weeks 52, 130 and 208, respectively), corresponding to approximately 4 to 5% increases relative to the average wage with no JC. Again, this is a different finding from Zhang et al. (2009) , where the effect of assignment on wages for the always-employed at week 208 was found to be negligible, after discarding units with missing outcomes, thus not adhering to the ITT principle. Note that, although the effect on employment is ideally estimated for the same group of units over the three weeks, i.e., compliers, the effects on wages are for the latent group of the always-employed compliers, which includes different units at different weeks.
Our results deviate from the naive conclusions one could draw from simple descriptive contrasts presented in Section 2; naive comparisons and simple IV comparisons, which neglect some of the complications, appear to overestimate the impact of the program. Differences between these contrasts and the estimated causal effects are larger at week 208, especially for wages, possibly due to the larger missingness rate observed at this week.
These are general overall results, which offer information on the effects of assignment for compliers, and thus the effects of participation in the program. However, simply looking at average effects limits the usefulness of the results, which do not offer particularly strong evidence in favor of the effectiveness of Job Corps, yet do not provide any constructive information to help understand what could be improved in the implementation of such a program. The framework we adopted, however, is not only a proper one for formally dealing with the complications of JC, but it also allows one to exploit the presence of these complications to extract additional information from the data. Specifically, further insights into the principal strata can be obtained by analyzing both the distribution of background characteristics and the distribution of wages within the strata; those analyses can generate useful suggestions for the re-design of the program. In Table 5 , the estimated average wages for all strata under treatment and under control are reported, along with asymptotic standard errors, in order to have a rough quantification of the sampling variability. In Tables 6, 7 and 8, the estimated means of the covariates within each stratum are reported, obtained using, for each unit, the design weights and the estimated membership probabilities.
The distribution of covariates among noncompliers suggests that the reasons for noncompliance may differ, implying that better suited programs should have been offered to different subjects.
The average characteristics of the n&EE individuals show that they are in general older and better educated with longer labour market experience: most of them already worked, had longer tenure in previous jobs and were better paid. They thus appear to be people, on average, who should not have been targets of the program in the first place. Conversely, the never-employed noncompliers, n&NN, are in general less likely to be white and more likely to be female and have children; they appear to be the right target of the program, and so their decision to not participate in the program may be partly explained by objective difficulties of participation due to family constraints, suggesting a more flexible training schedule for them may have satisfied their requirements.
Regarding the groups who participated in the program, the never-employed compliers, c&NN, are, in general, less likely to be well educated or white, they had shorter tenure in previous jobs and were paid less. They appear to be mostly disadvantaged individuals, with the worst average initial conditions. For them, participation in the program was not beneficial in terms of employment, suggesting a re-designed intervention for them, even more focussed on the disadvantaged participants, allowing them to improve their educational levels and acquire job-specific skills, or providing help with their job-search activities.
Compliers who are "sometimes employed" (c&NE and c&EN) are generally less likely to be female, to have children, or to have a partner; and more likely to be white. These characteristics suggest that these subjects are more mobile in the labor market and have fewer constraints than others; they are thus more likely to be observed without a job. This finding is also consistent with the evidence from Table 5 that these compliers have higher post JC average wages than the always employed compliers, c&EE, suggesting that these groups comprise individuals who are more selective when deciding whether to accept a job offer: they tend to have better paid but less stable jobs. This possibly mitigates the apparently disappointing result of a small effect of participation on employment.
The group of the always-employed compliers, c&EE, for whom the effect on wages was sought, does not show striking differences from the other compliers, except for the level of their wages, which from Table 5 appears to be lower, under either treatment or control, than the other groups when employed, c&NE, c&EN, and n&EE. The effect on wages for them is a positive and stable one, so that, for the c&EE subgroup, the program was mildly successful, in absolute and relative terms, in increasing labor productivity reflected in a wage increase.
In order to assess the robustness of our results to deviations from ignorability, we also provide estimates of causal effects, as well as the values of the scaled LRT statistics, obtained by maximizing the likelihood under Latent Ignorability (LI) and two different sets of restrictions, as detailed in the Appendix. Results, reported in Table 9 , show that the estimates of the relevant treatment effects are not sensitive to these three alternative assumptions on the missing data mechanism. In addition, the values of the scaled LRT statistics show that the data, also under LI, neither support monotonicity of employment nor a null effect on wages for the always employed compliers, but the data do support a null effect on employment for compliers. We argue that this substantial similarity of results, under ignorable and simple nonignorable models, is because we always condition on a rich set of baseline characteristics, which provide for relatively good predictions of the latent principal strata and of the missing potential outcomes. They also mitigate distributional assumptions on the potential outcomes within strata. Once we condition on these covariates, the missingness assumptions (as well as the distributional assumptions, as highlighted in Zhang at. al, 2009) make only minor differences, which stresses the importance of collecting baseline characteristics in experimental studies: they may help deal with subsequent complications that "break" the initial randomization.
Discussion
The framework we used, and the tools we developed, are appropriate for conducting an even more comprehensive longitudinal analysis. This, however, would have implied a growing number of principal strata, so we analyzed the three weeks separately. Even so, consistent results were obtained. For example, the percentage of noncompliers, which should be constant across all weeks, but not constrained to be so in our analysis, is estimated from Table 3 to be around 28 −29% at all weeks. This result can be seen as a simple diagnostic for the fit of our models.
Our analysis not only allowed the assessment of the overall effects of the program, but also the assessment of whether the program was well targeted, for whom the program worked best, and for which outcome. In fact, a policy relevant result obtained in this paper was the ability to characterize the latent subgroups in terms of their initial pre-treatment conditions. The most disadvantaged groups, with the worst average initial conditions in terms of education, labour market experience, race and gender, are the never-employed (c&NN and n&NN) , who did not benefit from the training program even when they decided to participate (c&NN). The groups of compliers who benefited from participation in terms of employment or wages appear to be less disadvantaged on average than the never-employed.
These findings may be useful to help re-design the program for better effectiveness: the nuanced results resolve much of the interpretational issues because they directly inform the policymaker about whether the program was well-targeted, whether it was uniformly effective for all the subjects, and about which of its objectives may have been achieved. In fact, as with most of the large job-training programs, Job Corps had, and still has, different aims and employed a mixture of instruments to try to reach them. Training activities may be specifically targeted at particular groups (e.g., the young or the disabled), may be designed to prevent long periods out of regular employment, or to integrate unemployed and disadvantaged individuals into the labour force, or they may be more oriented towards augmenting participants' human capital, either by helping them earn a higher educational degree or by formal teaching of new vocational skills. Job Corps employs "a holistic career development training approach which [sic] integrates the teaching of academic, vocational, employability skills and social competencies through a combination of classroom, practical and based learning experiences to prepare youth for stable, long-term, high-paying jobs". From our findings, Job Corps seems to have been successful only in augmenting participants' human capital, as measured by the effects on wages for the always-employed compliers, although it does not seem to have enhanced the employability of the more disadvantaged. mechanism, θ mis ), are distinct from those of the outcome distributions, θ sci ), the missing data process is ignorable (Rubin, 1976) , meaning that valid likelihood inference ignores the missing data model. Nonignorable missing-data mechanisms are often difficult to specify because there is rarely direct evidence in the data about the relationship between the missing-data mechanism and the missing values themselves. It is usually advisable to consider several nonignorable models, and to explore the sensitivity of estimates of relevant causal estimands to the different models, using a baseline analysis under MAR as a primary benchmark for comparison. In a PS framework, a plausible nonignorable missingness assumption is "Latent Ignorability" (LI), originally proposed by Frangakis and Rubin (1999) in a setting with noncompliance. Because here the scientifically relevant principal strata, G i , are defined according to noncompliance and potential employment status, we formulate Latent Ignorability to mean that, if we knew the group membership (G i ) of each unit, the missingness mechanism would be ignorable:
Under this assumption, given the covariates and treatment assignment, units with the same compliance behavior and potential employment status (and so with the same value of G i ) are expected to have the same distribution of wages, regardless of their missingness behavior. However, because the true compliance behaviors and the potential employment statuses are partially unobserved, the missing data process is nonignorable. We assume that the joint distribution
, has twelve independent parts, two for each of the six principal strata defined by G i , which are assumed to be conditionally independent. Specifically, let
be the probability of missing outcomes for unit i, i = 1, ..., N, when assigned treatment z, conditional on principal stratum membership g and X i ; θ mis = {θ g,z mis }, (g ∈ G, z = {0, 1}). These probabilities can be regarded as nuisance unknowns of little intrinsic scientific interest and, depending on the empirical context, modified versions of exclusion restrictions for them found in the literature may be plausible.
The first exclusion restriction assumes that compliers have the same probability of having a missing outcome irrespective of treatment assignment and employment status; similarly noncompliers have the same same probability of having a missing outcome irrespective of employment status, but these probabilities are allowed to differ by treatment assignment. This is a similar assumption to the response exclusion restriction for compliers proposed in Mealli et al. Because compliers are willing to follow the protocol in their assigned treatment, it seems more plausible that the missingness mechanism would not be affected by that assignment and the subsequent employment status.
The second exclusion restriction posits that noncompliers have the same probability of having a missing outcome irrespective of their treatment assignment and post-treatment employment status; similarly compliers have the same probability of having a missing outcome irrespective of employment status, but these probabilities are allowed to differ in the two treatment arms. This is a similar assumption to the response exclusion restriction for never-takers in Frangakis and Rubin (1999):
Under LI and either of these two sets of Assumptions (4 or 5), the missingness mechanism is not ignorable because the missingness probabilities do not factor out of the likelihood.
Specifically, let θ = {α, β, σ, θ mis } denote the vector parameter, where θ mis is the sub-vector of parameters governing the missingness probabilities in (3). Assuming LI, the likelihood function is derived as proportional to the joint distribution of (D(1), M obs , S obs , W obs |Z, X, θ):
i∈O (1, 1, 1) 
× i∈O (1,?,0) 
whereρ i:g,z = 1 − ρ i:g,z , and the missingness probabilities are specified using binary logistic models:
Missingness probabilities are regarded as nuisance unknowns, in contrast to parameters of the outcome principal strata distributions, which define causal estimands of interest. We maximize the likelihood under each of the two sets of restrictions (4) and (5).
EM steps under MAR
The complete-data log-likelihood function given the principal strata G i , i.e. treating G as the missing data, under ignorability can be written as follows:
where I(·) is the general indicator function. The E-step of the EM algorithm computes the conditional probabilities of each stratum, given the current estimate θ (t) sci , t = 0, 1, ...:
The expected log-likelihood l E (θ sci |D(1), M obs , S obs , W obs , Z, X) is obtained by replacing the I(G i = g) with the
The M-step maximizes l E (·) with respect to θ sci , leading to a new estimate θ
sci . Iterating this process monotonically increases the likelihood function (6); the algorithm continues until a stopping criterion has been satisfied.
The expected log-likelihood can be decomposed into two parts, one containing the parameters of the wage distribution (β and σ), and the other containing the parameters of the strata membership probabilities (α), because
As a consequence, the two sets of parameters can be updated separately. Standard routines for linear regression (for β and σ) and multinomial logistic models (for α) can be exploited, weighting the observations with the current probabilities (as estimated in the E-step). For example, updating β g,z and σ g,z requires maximizing the following function:
with z = {0, 1} and g ∈ G, which is the log-likelihood of a normal model, where each observation is weighted with the current probability of belonging to the principal stratum g. Weighted OLS can then be used for finding β
g,z and σ
EM steps under nonignorable models
The EM algorithm can be easily extended to include nonignorable missing data processes, although this includes the estimation of the parameters governing the missingness mechanism, θ mis .
Under Latent Ignorability, the complete-data log-likelihood function for θ = {θ sci , θ mis }, given the principal strata, can be written as follows:
+ i∈O (1,?,0) I(G i = c&NE) log ρ i:c&NE,1 π i:c&NE + i∈O (1,?,0) I(G i = c&NN) log ρ i:c&NN,1 π i:c&NN + i∈O (1,?,0) I(G i = n&NN) log ρ i:n&NN,1 π i:n&NN 
The E-step of the EM algorithm computes the conditional probabilities of each stratum, given the current estimates θ (t) , t = 0, 1, ...: 
The expected log-likelihood, l E (θ|D(1), M obs , S obs , W obs , Z, X), is obtained by replacing
The M-step maximizes l E (·) with respect to θ, to obtain θ (t+1) . Table 2 : Univariate descriptive statistics for outcome variables by treatment group, computed using units with observed values for the specified variable and using design weights. Table 4 : Maximum likelihood estimates of the average effects of treatment assignment on employment (∆ (ZS ) ) and of the average treatment effects on employment for compliers (∆ Table 9 : Maximum likelihood estimates of average treatment effects and scaled LRT statistics under different assumptions about the missingness mechanism.
